





RESEARCH SEMINAR IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
Department of Economics
The University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-1220
SEMINAR DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 220
COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ESTIMATES OF THE






The University of Michigan
For presentation at Lehigh University Conference on Economic Aspects of Regional
Trading Arrangements, Bethlehem, PA, May 25-27, 1988.
*Financial assistance was provided in part by a grant from the Ford Foundation in
support of a program of research on trade policy in the Institute of Public Policy Studies
at The University of Michigan. We would like to thank Chris Jackson for assistance with




Institute of Public Policy Studies
Lorch Hall
The University of Michigan





The University of Michigan

f
COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ESTIMATES OF THE






The University of Michigan
Abstract
We have constructed a computable general equilibrium model to analyze the
economic effects of the bilateral tariff reductions that will be implemented in the U.S.-
Canadian Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The model includes the United States, Canada,
32 other countries combined, and the rest of world. There are 22 tradable sectors and 7
nontradable sectors in each country/region. The market structures for industries in the
United States and Canada are classified according to the degree of competition, degree of
product differentiation, and the ease with which new firms can enter a market.
Our results indicate that bilateral tariff removal in the FTA will increase U.S.
imports by $6 billion and exports by $7.3 billion, based on 1976 trade. Canada's imports
increase by $8.3 billion and exports by $8.5 billion. U.S. welfare rises by $1.5 billion,
which is 0.1% of U.S. GSP in 1976. Canada's welfare rises by $2 billion, which is 1.1% of
its 1976 GDP. On a sectoral level, the results suggest that there will be increases in
inter-industry as well as intra-industry trade together with changes in scale economies
due to industry rationalization and derationalization in the two nations. Output and
employment effects in the United States appear to be relatively small while some
potentially sizable changes may occur in a number of sectors in Canada.

I. Introduction
The purpose of our paper is to provide some estimates of the economic effects of
the elimination of bilateral U.S. and Canadian tariffs that will be implemented as the
result of the U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that was negotiated in 1986-87
and is currently (May 1988) awaiting legislative approval in the two nations. While we
focus on bilateral tariff elimination, it should be emphasized that the FTA deals with a
number of nontariff barriers (NTBs) as well. These include, for example, the elimination
of certain bilateral agricultural and related NTBs, removal of Canadian provincial wine
restrictions, removal of U.S. countervailing duties on shakes and shingles, removal of
voluntary restraints on Canadian steel exports to the United States, and a lower threshold
for bidding on government procurement contracts for specified entities in the two nations.
However, as we will note later in the paper, these changes in bilateral NTBs appear to be
of comparatively minor importance.
Aspects of the agreement concerning the administrative governance of bilateral
trade may ultimately prove to be the most interesting and significant. These include: new
and possibly more liberal and transparent rules and procedures involving bilateral trade
and investment in automobiles and parts, energy products, and services; certain
clarifications and guarantees involving nondiscrimination in foreign direct investment; and
some potentially very important arrangements for the settlement of trade and investment
disputes that might arise in bilateral relations.
Bilateral removal of tariffs and certain NTBs can be analyzed in quantitative
terms. But it is unfortunately very difficult to quantify the economic benefits that may
arise from improvements in the rules and procedures governing international trade and
investment transactions. Such benefits may nonetheless be substantial from the
standpoint of both the United States and Canada, and must be factored into an overall
assessment of the FTA.
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To evaluate the FTA, we first review in Section II the various effects that the
FTA might have on the United States and Canada. In Section III, we discuss the findings
of previous studies of the effects of the FTA. We then describe in Section IV the
computational model that we have developed for the purpose of analyzing the effects of the
FTA, and we present our empirical results in Section V. We conclude in Section VI with a
summary assessment.
II. Analyzing the Economic Impacts of the FTA
An indication of the size and sectoral characteristics of post-Tokyo Round bilateral
Canadian and U.S. tariffs and NTBs is given in Table 1. It is evident from this table that
Canadian bilateral tariffs and NTBs are noticeably higher for most sectors as compared to
the United States. If we assume that these tariffs and NTBs are to be removed in the
course of the implementation of the FTA, what will the effects be?
It is possible analytically to identify three main channels by which the removal of
tariffs and NTBs would affect the two nations. These include: (1) inter-sectoral
specialization effects; (2) rationalization effects; and (3) macroeconomic effects. In
addition, the changes brought about by the FTA in the rules and procedures involving
bilateral trade and investment may result in a reduction in the uncertainty of policies and
therefore provide additional elements of potential benefit to the two nations.
Inter-Sectoral Specialization
A central issue in evaluating the FTA is how bilateral tariff removal may affect
the allocation of factors of production among sectors of the economy. Depending on the
relative levels of tariffs and NTBs in the two countries, some of the tradable goods sectors
will expand whereas others will contract as the PTA liberalization takes effect. Productive
resources will thus presurnably be allocated more efficiently as cornpared to the pre-FTA
position as each country specializes in the production of tradable goods in which it has a
comparative advantage.
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We might also expect a shift in production of tradable goods away from the
production of nontradables (e.g., goods and services that are limited spatially because of
transportation costs and other characteristics that require close proximity between
production and consumption). The bilateral elimination of tariffs will result in reductions
in consumer prices due to the lower costs of imported goods as well as reductions in the
prices of imported inputs that firms use in the production process. Lower prices of inputs
will result in lower costs to firms and possibly lower prices of goods to consumers as well.
Both of the foregoing effects will result in a shift towards tradable goods whose prices will
fall relative to nontradables.
In analyzing these various effects, there are some interesting and important
modeling issues that arise when characterizing the U.S. and Canadian economies and the
relations between them and with third countries. For example, suppose that we assume a
world in which the goods being produced and traded are homogeneous across firms and
countries, there are constant returns to scale in production, and goods markets are
perfectly competitive. Assume further that Canada is a small country economically
speaking, so that the formation of an FTA would not affect equilibrium world prices.
In such a model, Canada would gain unambiguously from the formation of a FTA.
As a result of preferential treatment, Canada would receive the world price plus the U.S.
tariff on any exports to the U.S. These are more favorable terms of trade than Canada
could obtain from sales either to any other market or to the U.S. market in the absence of
the FTA.
While this outcome may seem intuitively plausible, it involves an important
difficulty. With preferential trading, the small country may trade only with the large
country and will cease to trade with the rest of world.
In order to avoid this implausible outcome, it has been common to assume that
the products of the trading nations are differentiated nationally according to where they
are produced. Allowance for "love of variety" in the utility functions of consumers
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guarantees that all bilateral trade flows will continue in the event that a preferential
trading bloc is formed.
This formulation, however, has proven to have difficulties as well. Under national
product differentiation, the relative sizes of the national tariffs and NTBs will determine
how the two countries might be affected by an FTA. As we have seen, Canadian tariffs
are noticeably higher than U.S. tariffs. Consequently, the United States will penetrate
Canadian markets more deeply in a number of sectors as compared to Canada's
penetration of U.S. markets. In these circumstances, the relative demand for the variety
of each good produced by Canada will fall, leading to a decline in its price. Canada will
thus experience a deterioration in its terms of trade and it is conceivable that Canadian
welfare could decline.
This feature of models in which goods are distinguished by country of origin arises
because each country has a monopoly in the supply of the particular varieties of goods that
it trades in world markets. Since market power can be exploited through the use of a
tariff, optimal tariffs may therefore be relatively large, even for small countries.
Preferential as well as multilateral trade liberalization may therefore result in significant
changes in the terms of trade. These terms of trade changes, rather than efficiency gains
from intersectoral reallocation of resources, may accordingly dominate the welfare
conclusions.
If a model of this kind were to be used to analyze the U.S.-Canadian FTA, the
results would then be predisposed towards a terms of trade decline and welfare reduction
of the country with the relatively higher tariffs. Thus we would expect that Canada's
welfare would decline while U.S. welfare would rise.
In seeking alternatives to national product differentiation, one possibility might be
to assume that there is product differentiation at the firm level. In this case, bilateral
trade flows would be sustained with a preferential trading arrangement since no two firms
in the world would sell the same variety. Another alternative is to assume that all firms
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supply a homogeneous product but that national markets are segmented so that firms
make separate price and supply decisions for each national market. If firms behave as
Cournot followers, taking output by other firms as fixed, then preferential trading would
leave all of the bilateral trade flows intact.
It will be evident in these cases that the firms involved can exercise some degree
of market power. This means that it is no longer possible to maintain the assumption of
perfect competition, and that it is necessary accordingly to proceed in a framework in
which there are imperfectly competitive firms. Once we make allowance for imperfect
competition, this raises the possibility that there may be economies of scale and changes in
product variety at the firm level that have to be taken into account.
Rationalization Effects
Proponents of a U.S.-Canadian FTA have placed great emphasis on the gains that
might be obtained from the realization of scale economies and the increased product
variety that mutual market access will make possible. In addition, it is believed that the
influx of tariff-free imports will improve the competitive environment for firms selling
domestically, requiring these firms either to shut down and leave the industry or to
increase their efficiency. Bilateral free trade can thus be expected to result in a
rationalization of the production process by increasing output per firm and lowering
average total cost.
According to this line of reasoning, there is a presumption that Canadian
manufacturing firms especially will undergo rationalization as the consequence of the FTA.
This is because Canadian tariffs may have sheltered domestic firms historically, with the
consequence that plants may be of suboptimal size and a large variety of products may be
produced by individual firms. With the removal of bilateral tariffs and NTBs, Canadian
firms will be induced by increased competitive pressures and profit considerations to take
advantage of enhanced market opportunities by expanding output and reducing the
number of product varieties. It is contended that the United States is less likely to gain
6
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from rationalization because the attainment of optimal plant size and concentration on a
limited number of product varieties are more feasible in the U.S. market because of its
comparatively large size.
While there may well be rationalization as the result of a U.S.-Canadian FTA,
questions arise about the actual importance of rationalization and the economic factors
that will govern its realization. The relatively low tariff rates noted in Table 1 suggest
that U.S. and Canadian firms already enjoy substantial access to each other's markets.
Furthermore, Canadian firms have had to adapt to the multilateral tariff reductions
implemented during the 1970s and 1980s as the result of the Kennedy and Tokyo Round
negotiations. Finally, we may note that many Canadian firms are already being subjected
to the efficiency-stimulating experience of having to compete with U.S. firms in the U.S.
market. How large the benefits from rationalization will be as the result of the FTA is
therefore unclear.
If there already exist significant pro-competitive effects in the trade relations
between the United States and Canada, the issue is whether and how rationalization may
occur in response to the bilateral removal of the existing relatively low tariffs. As we
argue below, whether or not small tariff changes lead to rationalization will depend on the
factor-intensity characteristics and cost structure of the firms and industries involved.
This insight is potentially important because it implies that there may be a significant
amount of inter-industry resource reallocation as the result of an FTA in contrast to the
mainly intra-industry changes that have been emphasized in previous research.
Macroeconomic Effects
We have already mentioned that the bilateral elimination of tariffs and NTBs will
lead to reductions in consumer prices, which may in turn result in an increase in the real
disposable income of consumers. If this leads to increased consumer spending, the
economies are operating at less than full employment, and domestic macroeconomic
policies remain unchanged, then there will be an increase in real GNP, output, trade, and
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employment in both countries in the short-to-medium run. To the extent that these
macroeconomic changes occur, they will reinforce the microeconomic benefits stemming
from lower consumer prices, improvements in resource allocation, and the realization of
economies of scale.
Reduction in the Uncertainty of Policies
In addition to the readily quantifiable effects of trade liberalization, there may be
a number of potentially important benefits resulting from changes in the rules and
procedures governing international trade and investment relations between the United
States and Canada. These include the agreements that limit the use by Canada of
investment performance requirements for foreign affiliates of U.S. firms, the guarantee of
national treatment and rights of establishment for foreign firms investing in most
industries, the removal of Canadian duty remission schemes that had been condoned in the
U.S.-Canadian Auto Pact, and less nationalistic and potentially discriminatory Canadian
energy and agricultural policies.
New dispute settlement procedures will also be established that are especially
important to Canada. They are designed to depoliticize the investigation of trade and
investment disputes and to reduce the likelihood that politically driven and therefore
damaging actions will be taken by the United States. The costs of conducting trade and
investment transactions may thus be materially reduced as the result of the FTA.
Having considered in general terms the economic effects that may result from the
bilateral elimination of existing trade barriers, let us now review briefly what previous
studies of a U.S.-Canadian FTA have concluded.
III. What Do Previous Studies Suggest About The Effects of the FTA?
In order to determine the importance of existing restrictions and policies and thus
to determine what the economic effects might be of removing the restrictions and bringing
about changes in policies, it is necessary to rely on some kind of economic model. In
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choosing an economic model for purposes of analysis, it is imperative that the analyst
make clear what the important assumptions and limitations of the model are. This
includes a complete and careful statement of the theoretical foundations of the model being
used, how the parameters of the model have been selected, and a description and
documentation of the data used in implementing the model. These are obviously important
matters that should be insisted upon by those who will be using the model in question and
are depending on it to obtain numerical results that are to be trusted in evaluating the
policy options involved.
Broadly speaking, there are two classes of models that can be used. The first is
an econometric model that is based on historical relationships that can be presumed to
remain unchanged in the relevant policy horizon. If an econometric model is constructed
and it fits the data well, it can then be used to make forecasts of how important variables
such as output, trade, and employment might be affected by the FTA. It should then be
possible ex post to compare the model forecasts with actual values to determine how
accurate the forecasts may have been.
Unfortunately, many of the changes that will come about as the result of the FTA
depend on a variety of complex microeconomic behavioral relations and intersectoral and
inter-country interactions. Constructing an econometric model that adequately captures
these intricate microeconomic relationships is not currently feasible. Nonetheless, as will
be noted below, a number of efforts have been made to adapt existing macroeconometric
models of the Canadian economy for the purpose of estimating the effects of the FTA.
However, it is by no means clear how the results are to be interpreted since the models
used do not have well articulated microeconomic structures.
Instead of using an econometric approach, an alternative is to construct a general
equilibrium model that will incorporate the important behavioral and interaction effects
and that can be solved computationally so as to yield numerical results relating to the
potential impacts of the FTA. In recent years, there has been considerable progress made
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in developing and using general equilibrium computational models, and a number of such
models have been adapted to analysis of the FTA.
It should be emphasized that these computational models do not provide
predictions that can be compared against actual outcomes. Rather, the numerical results
of the models are to be interpreted in the light of their assumptions, parameters, and data.
This means that, in evaluating model results, tests should be conducted to determine how
sensitive or robust the results are to changes in different aspects of the model.
The general equilibrium models that have been used to date to estimate the
effects of a U.S.-Canadian FTA include Harris and Cox (1985), Hamilton and Whalley
(1985), Markusen and Wigle (1987), Wigle (1988), and Brown and Stern (1987). The
Canadian Government's Department of Finance (1988) has used the Harris-Cox model,
with adaptations of some key parameters and more recent data on tariffs and NTBs to
provide some other estimates of the effects of the FTA.
The Harris-Cox and Department of Finance models refer only to the effects of the
FTA on Canada since the United States and the rest of world are not modeled explicitly.
The Hamilton-Whalley, Wigle, Markusen-Wigle, and Brown-Stern models identify separate
effects of the FTA for Canada, the United States, and the rest of world.
Some key results are summarized in Table 2 together with estimates based on
macroeconometric models of the Canadian economy that have been adapted especially for
the purpose of analyzing the impact of the FTA on Canada. It should be noted that in
each case the bilateral tariffs were assumed to be eliminated all at once rather than being
phased in over a ten-year period as called for in the actual implementation of the FTA.
Thus, in any given year during the implementation process, the effects of the FTA would
be a cumulative fraction of the ultimate effect over the entire period.
The estimate based on the Harris-Cox (1985) model suggests that the real income
(welfare) gains resulting from the ETA could approach nearly 9% of Canadian GNP. The
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size of this gain depends crucially on the parameters that Harris and Cox use to represent
rationalization effects and the assumed pricing rules for Canadian manufacturing firms.
Two imperfectly competitive market structures were adopted by Harris and Cox.
Under the assumption of monopolistic competition, profit-maximizing firms set price as a
mark-up over marginal cost. The size of the mark-up depends on the firm's perceived
market power. Alternatively, firms within an industry may tacitly collude, by adopting a
"focal price" which is charged by all firms. Harris and Cox set the focal price equal to the
world price plus the import tariff. The actual price charged by each firm is assumed to be
a weighted average of the monopolistically competitive and focal prices.
The effect of tariff liberalization on firm output can be determined by evaluating
the impact on each component of the pricing rule. Tariff reductions increase import
competition. For monopolistically competitive firms, increased competition raises the
perceived elasticity of demand so that the profit-maximizing mark-up over marginal cost
falls. The focal price of collusive firms also declines, since this price is equal to the world
price plus the tariff. Free entry is assumed. Therefore, a fall in price must be
accompanied by an increase in firm output to satisfy the zero-profits condition.
The version of the Harris-Cox model used by the Canadian Department of
Finance suggests an estimated real income gain of 2.5%, which is considerably less than
the original Harris-Cox result. Rationalization effects nonetheless remain the driving
force, resulting from the amalgamated pricing behavior being assumed for the imperfectly
competitive Canadian manufacturing firms.
The results obtained by Wigle and by Markusen and Wigle further illustrate the
sensitivity of this approach to the precise theoretical and parametric specification. In both
studies, monopolistically competitive and collusive behavior are modeled as in Harris and
Cox. However, each industry is specified as either monopolistically competitive or collusive.
Markusen and Wigle find that Canada's welfare would rise by 0.6% of national income,
which is only one-quarter of the increase calculated by the Department of Finance, and
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that U.S. welfare would rise by 0.1%. Wigle finds that bilateral tariff removal will result
in a decline in welfare for Canada of 0.1% of national income and welfare for the United
States will rise by 0.1%. The decline in welfare for Canada appears to be the result of a
deterioration in the terms of trade.
Hamilton and Whalley's results are considerably smaller than those obtained
especially by Harris and Cox and the Department of Finance. Hamilton and Whalley use
a model in which there is perfect competition and constant returns to scale, and they allow
for national product differentiation. Brown and Stern use a somewhat different modeling
approach, but they also assume perfect competition, constant returns to scale, and national
product differentiation.
It is noteworthy that Hamilton and Whalley obtain a positive welfare gain for
Canada equal to 0.6% of GNP and a welfare loss of 0.04% for the United States as the
result of the bilateral removal of tariffs whereas Brown and Stern report a welfare loss of
0.3% of GNP for Canada and a welfare gain of 0.03% for the United States. Given the
relatively higher Canadian tariffs, it would have been expected that Canada might well
experience a decline in its terms of trade and thus in welfare, which is what Brown and
Stern found to be the case. It is therefore not clear why Hamilton and Whalley obtained
the results noted.
The macroeconometric approach can be used for the purpose of analyzing the
effects of the FTA by first determining the amount by which the import and export prices
and volume of trade of the two countries may change. These factors are then entered as
exogenous changes in the model and a solution is obtained for changes in the variables of
interest.
Since the macroeconometric models used do not have well articulated
microeconomic structures, it cannot be readily determined how the aggregate results
obtained correspond to the results based on the general equilibrium trade models. To
illustrate this point, we may note, for example, that the Economic Council of Canada
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(Magun et al., 1987, 1988) used the CANDIDE econometric model of the Canadian
economy to carry out two simulations of the effects of the FTA. The first simulation
considered only the macroeconomic impacts of the bilateral removal of tariffs and certain
NTBs while the second simulation involved an adjustment to take into account the possible
rationalization (scale) effects that might occur in Canada. This necessitated decomposing
the aggregate effects by sector on the basis of a Canadian input-output table and applying
rationalization coefficients estimated for individual industries. The results thus reflect the
structure of the CANDIDE macroeconometric model in combination with the Canadian
input-output structure and scale economy parameters, but without explicit behavioral
relations linking the various factors.
Several of the studies noted in Table 2 provide detailed results indicating how
trade, output, employment, and the returns to capital in individual sectors in Canada and
the United States might be affected by the FTA. Considerable interest is attached to the
sectoral results insofar as they indicate which industries may expand or contract as a
consequence of the FTA. However, because the studies noted in Table 2 vary
substantially in terms of their modeling methodology and the particular assumptions made
concerning market structure, pricing behavior, and the choice of elasticity and scale
parameters, their sectoral details are bound to be different. We shall not dwell therefore
on sectoral comparisons at this point. Instead, what we propose now is to turn to our own
computational model that we have developed to estimate the economic effects of the U.S.-
Canadian FTA. When we present our sectoral results below, we shall have occasion to
comment on how they differ from those in some of the studies noted in Table 2.
III. The Computational Model
The review of previous modeling efforts reveals a number of modeling choices
which caste doubt on the robustness of the results obtained. First, national product
differentiation has been adopted in all of the general equilibrium trade models discussed
above for the purpose of identifying the bilateral trade flows to receive preferential
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treatment. However, this assumption gives rise to terms of trade considerations that
dominate the welfare conclusions of tariff liberalization. In view of the strong implications
and artificial nature of this assumption, we have chosen to allow intra-industry trade to
emerge naturally as the result of strategic firm behavior. National product differentiation
is adopted only in perfectly competitive sectors in which firm behavior does not lead to
intra-industry trade.
Second, the use of "focal pricing" to model collusive behavior by firms predisposes
the model to the conclusion that tariff liberalization increases output per firm. However,
this market structure has been strongly criticized as unsustainable in the presence of free
entry. We have not adopted the focal pricing mechanism here, but rather adhere more
closely to those market structures that are more robust theoretically.
Third, industry organization varies according to the degree of competition or
market power, the degree of product differentiation, and the ease with which new firms
can enter a market. Therefore, a variety of possible market structures have been
integrated into the model to accommodate competitive differences.
The model has some features in common with previous general equilibrium
models used to analyze the FTA. However, we capture a broader array of imperfectly
competitive market structures in both nations and do so without relying on the ad hoc firm
behavior and national product differentiation assumptions that have driven the results of
previous work.
The model consists of four trading regions. Canada, the United States, and a
group of 32 other countries are modeled explicitly,1 and the rest of the world constitutes
an abbreviated fourth region.
1The 32 countries include 16 industrialized countries -Australia, Austria, Belgium-
Luxembourg, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom - and 16 newly industrializing countries - Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Greece, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Mexico, Portugal, Singapore, South Korea, Spain,
Taiwan, Turkey, and Yugoslavia.
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Sectoral coverage includes 22 tradable product categories based on three-digit
ISIC industries and 7 nontradable categories based on one-digit ISIC industries.2 Each
industry in the model can be characterized by one of five market structures, including: (1)
perfect competition; (2) monopolistic competition with free entry; (3) monopolistic
competition without entry; (4) market segmentation with free entry; and (5) market
segmentation without entry.
An overview of the model is provided below. For those readers interested in the
technical details, the equations and variables of the model are set out in the appendix to
the paper.
To elaborate on the different market structures, it will be recalled from our earlier
discussion that, in order to identify bilateral trade flows that are to receive preferential
treatment, one approach is to assume that products can be differentiated either by country
of origin or by firm. Both the perfectly competitive and monopolistically competitive
industries in our model are characterized accordingly by some degree of product
differentiation. In the case of perfect competition, products are assumed to be
differentiated by country, while in the monopolistically competitive industries products are
differentiated by firm.
In both cases, we adopt the approach to product differentiation suggested by Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977) and Spence (1976). Consumers and producers are assumed to use a
two-stage procedure for allocating expenditure across differentiated products. At the first
stage, expenditure is allocated across goods, without regard for the country of origin or the
producing firm. At this stage the utility function is taken to be Cobb-Douglas, and the
production function requires inputs in fixed proportion.
The appendix below contains the proportionately differentiated version of the
model, with the circumflex indicating proportionate change. Final and intermediate
2Our country and sectoral coverage correspond to that used in various adaptations of the
Michigan Model of World Production and Trade. See Deardorif and Stern (1986), Brown
(1988), and Brown and Stern (1987).
15
demands for tradable good j in country i are given by equations (1) and (3) and final and
intermediate demands for nontradable good j are given by equations (2) and (4). Final and
intermediate demand are aggregated to form total demand for tradables and nontradables
in equations (5) and (6).
In the second stage, expenditure on each good chosen in the first stage is allocated
among the competing varieties. The aggregation function at this stage is CES. The
demand for each variety, conditional on the level of the aggregate chosen in the first stage,
is given in equation (7). For perfectly competitive industries, equation (7a) is demand in
country i for the variety produced by country r. For monopolistically competitive
industries, equation (7b) gives demand in country i for the variety produced by a
representative firm in country r. These equations differ in that entry in an industry will
reduce the demand for other competing firms.
Perfectly competitive firms set price equal to marginal cost, as given in equation
(19a). However, monopolistically competitive firms maximize profits by setting price as a
mark-up over marginal cost, as given in the second term in equation (19b). It will be noted
that the more elastic is demand, the smaller will be the difference between price and
marginal cost.
Imperfectly competitive industries in which all firms produce a homogeneous
product are modeled following Venables (1985). In this case, each firm behaves as a
Cournot follower and assumes that national markets are segmented. The firm establishes
a set of profit-maximizing prices, one for each national market, assuming that output by
other firms is fixed. It can be shown, under these conditions, that a representative firm's
sales to country r is given by equation (7c).
Turning to the factor markets, the variable input requirements are taken to be
the same for all market structures. Primary and intermediate input aggregates are
required in fixed proportion to output. Expenditure on primary inputs is allocated between
capital and labor,, assuming that a CES function is used to form the primary input
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aggregate. This assumption implies conditional labor and capital demands given by
equations (10a) and (1la). In imperfectly competitive industries, an additional fixed input
of capital is required, thus yielding conditional factor demands in equations (l0b), (l0c),
(11b), and (11c).
Capital and labor are assumed to be perfectly mobile between sectors. The return
to capital is determined to equate demand to a fixed supply of capital, as given by equation
(27). The return to labor is fixed. However, total expenditure is set endogenously to
maintain the demand for labor to a fixed supply of labor, as given by equation (28).
The number of firms in each industry is determined by the zero-profit condition.
In the free-entry versions of the monopolistic competition and market segmentation market
structures, the number of firms is determined to guarantee that price equals average total
cost, as given by equations (24b) and (24c). In all other cases, the number of firms is
assumed not to change.3
Equilibrium prices are determined in world markets. In the perfectly competitive
industries, total demand for each national variety must equal national output as in
equation (31a). For monopolistically competitive industries, total demand for the variety
produced by each firm must equal supply by that firm, as in equation (31b). In the case of
market segmentation, total supply by all firms to each national market must equal
demand in that market, as given by equation (31c).
Tariffs and exchange rates link equilibrium prices determined in the world system
to prices paid by consumers or received by sellers in the country system. In the perfectly
competitive and monopolistically competitive industries, the price determined in the world
system is the price received by the seller denominated in the numeraire currency, which is
the U.S. dollar. The price paid by the consumer, then, is the world price, plus changes in
the exchange rate and tariffs, as can be seen in equations (14a) and (14b). In the case of
3Under perfect competition, technology is characterized by constant returns to scale.
Therefore, the number of firms is indeterminant. However, the threat of entry guarantees
marginal cost pricing and zero profits.
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market segmentation, the price determined in the world system is the price paid by the
consumer denominated in the numeraire currency. The price received by the seller is the
world price, plus changes in the exchange rate, but minus the tariff applied by the
importing country, as is shown by equation (14c).
The exchange rates for Canada and the group of other countries are determined
to maintain the trade balance at its level in the base period. This is shown by equation
(30i), where the trade balance is defined by equation (29). With the U.S. dollar taken as
the numeraire, the price of the dollar is thus held constant as in equation (30i'). In the
case of the rest of the world, the currency is assumed to be pegged to a market basket of
currencies, but an import licensing scheme is adopted to hold the current account at the
base level. The tariff equivalent of an import license is calculated endogenously, as in
equation (34).4
The model is in linear form and thus can be solved by matrix inversion. The base
year is 1976 for data on production, employment, and trade for the United States,
Canada, and other countries, and the rest of the world. Input-output coefficients for the
production function were derived from the U.S. input-output table for 1972 and the
Canadian table for 1976.
The market structure assignments by industry are listed in Table 3. These
assignments represent our judgment of the industrial organization characteristics of each
industry.5 It may be that other analysts would choose different characteristics than the
ones that we have selected. In this event, we could enter these alternative characteristics
and solve the model accordingly.
The key parameters of the model are reported in Tables 4A, 4B, and 4C for the
United States, and Tables 5A, 5B, and 5C for Canada. The bilaterally trade-weighted
4See Deardorff and Stern (1986, pp. 22-23) for a discussion of the role of import licensing
in the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade.
5We are indebted to Lynne Pepall for assistance in selecting the industry characteristics.
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tariff averages for each industry involved in U.S.-Canada trade are listed in the last
column of these tables.6
For the imperfectly competitive industries, the elasticity of demand, share of
capital that is fixed, variable cost share of total cost, and the mark-up of price over
marginal cost are all derivable from the theoretical structure of the model. Details are
given in Brown and Stern (1988). The only data required are labor's share of primary
input cost and primary input share of total cost, which were obtained from the input-
output tables, and an indicator of the elasticity of substitution among different varieties of
each good. The elasticity of substitution is set at 15.7
IV. Computational Results
We have used the model described above to investigate the economic welfare
effects of bilateral tariff removal on the United States and Canada, assuming that the
existing bilateral tariffs are to be removed all at once rather than in stages. An overview
of the results is presented in Table 6. U.S. imports increase by $6 billion and exports
increase by $7.3 billion based on trade in 1976. Canada's imports rise by $8.3 billion and
exports rise by $8.5 billion. Welfare, as measured by the equivalent variation,8
6These tariff averages do not correspond to those listed in Table 1 because of differences
in industry classification and the year chosen for trade weighting. Also, we have not taken
into account the ad valorem equivalents of the NTBs noted in Table 1. According to
Magun et al. (1988, pp. 24-34), only minor modifications are to be made in existing NTBs
in the course of implementation of the FTA. Nonetheless, some of our sector results for
bilateral tariff removal will be overstated to the extent that the existing NTBs will serve to
dampen the impact of the tariff removal.
Values of the elasticity of substitution below 15 imply a value for fixed capital's share of
total capital outside the interval (0,1).
8The equivalent variation is the income change valued at base period prices that yields
the same change in welfare as the tariff reductions. The welfare calculation has two
components. First, ex ante and ex post utility are calculated for each country using the
explicit utility function and then converted to the equivalent variation. (See Shoven and
Whalley (1984), p. 1014, equation (13)). Second, changes in real international debt are
calculated by deflating the nominal trade balance by the change in the price level.
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increases for both countries as well. Canada's welfare rises by $2 billion, which is 1.1% of
GDP in 1976, despite a deterioration in its terms of trade of 0.2%. U.S. welfare rises by a
smaller $1.5 billion which is less than 0.1% of U.S. GDP in 1976. The other countries of
the model experience a trivially small decline in welfare of $143 million.
Sectoral results for the United States and Canada are reported in Tables 7 and 8,
respectively. For each country, the perfectly competitive industry results appear in section
A of each table, the monopolistically competitive industry results in section B, and the
segmented market industry results in section C.
The percent changes in exports, imports, and bilateral imports by sector are
reported in the first three columns of each table. U.S. imports from Canada generally rise.
The industries with the largest increases include textiles (101.0%), clothing (228.4%),
footwear(130.3%), nonferrous metals (167.5%), and glass products (107.4%). The only
sector that does not show a significant change in bilateral trade is transportation
equipment (0.1%), which is already duty free under the Auto Pact. There are several
industries in which U.S. imports from Canada decline, including wood products (-2.0%),
paper (- 23.4%), printing and publishing (- 7.5%), nonmetallic mineral products (-19.2%),
and petroleum products (-11.4%). Canada's imports from the United States increase in
every sector, with the largest changes occurring in textiles (179.9%), clothing (283.4%),
footwear (254.6%), furniture and fixtures (179.5%), paper products (103.1%), metal
products (114.4%), and rubber products (100.9%). Given that existing bilateral tariffs are
highest in textiles, clothing, and footwear, the computations suggest that there could be a
dramatic increase in bilateral trade in these sectors unless this trade were to be restrained
by some sort of intervention.
We mentioned in our previous discussion that there are two sources of welfare
gain from liberalization. The first is inter-industry specialization. The import and export
results indicate that the FTA would bring about substantial increases in intra-industry
trade. However, considerable inter-industry specialization can also be expected.
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The specialization results can be inferred from the percent changes in industry
output reported in column 4 of each table. The chemicals and transportation equipment
industries are the only sectors in which output increases in both countries. There are only
three sectors that contract in both countries: agriculture, food, and nonelectrical
machinery. Specialization will thus be occurring in the remaining seventeen tradable
sectors. There are five sectors in which output in the United States declines while output
in Canada rises. These include leather products, footwear, nonferrous metals, iron and
steel, and miscellaneous manufactures. Nonferrous metals is the industry most
dramatically affected, with a decline in output in the United States of 13.6%, and an
increase in Canada of 152.4%. Canada's iron and steel industry may undergo a significant
expansion, with output rising by 28.5%.
The United States, as the larger country, would evidently specialize in a broader
range of product categories. Thus, output in the United States would increase while
output in Canada would decline in twelve sectors, including: wood products; textiles;
clothing; furniture and fixtures; paper products; printing and publishing; nonmetallic
mineral products; metal products; electrical machinery; rubber products; glass products;
and petroleum products. In most cases, the increase in U.S. output is less than one
percent. The exceptions are textiles (3.9%), paper products (3.2%), and electrical
machinery (1.2%). The impact on Canadian producers appears, however, to be more
noticeable. For example, Canadian textile production declines by 35.4%, paper products by
19.3%, nonmetallic mineral products by 16.8%, and electrical machinery by 14.2%.
The second source of welfare gain is the rationalization effect, which involves
increasing output per firm, thereby realizing economies of scale in the industries with
declining average cost. The change in output per firm can be determined by comparing the
percent change in industry output, in column 4 of each table, to the percent change in the
number of firms in each industry, in column 5. Of the 24 imperfectly competitive
industries, output per firm in the United States rises in ten, falls in five, and remains
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unchanged in nine. In Canada, output per firm increases in sixteen industries and falls in
eight.
The determinants of output per firm vary by industry. In cases in which there
are barriers to entry, firm output depends only on industry output. Therefore, industries
that are expanding in response to inter-industry specialization will also experience an
increase in output per firm. The United States, as the larger of the two countries, will
specialize in a broader range of product categories. Firms in these sectors will increase
output. Indeed, half of the industries that rationalize in the United States fall into this
category. Textiles, chemicals, petroleum products, rubber products, and glass products are
all sectors that are characterized as having barriers to entry and that record increases in
industry output.
On the other hand, firms in heavily protected industries, which contract with
liberalization, will reduce output. This effect accounts for most instances of de-
rationalization in Canada. Since trade liberalization will lead Canada to specialize in a
smaller number of products, output in many industries will decline. For contracting
industries in which there are barriers to entry, output per firm will fall. This effect
accounts for five of the seven tradable sectors that de-rationalize in Canada. These include
textiles, petroleum products, rubber products, glass products, and nonelectrical machinery.
However, if entry or exit of firms can occur, then firm output will depend on the
interaction between the firm's perceived demand and average total cost curves. The zero-
profit condition requires tangency between demand and average total cost. Therefore, if
either curve changes shape, the point of tangency will occur at a new level of output.
Relative factor prices determine the shape of average total cost.9  However, the
computational results indicate that the wage-rental ratio will be barely affected insofar as
9For a detailed discussion of the role of factor prices and factor intensities in determining
output per firm, see Brown and Stern (1988).
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the return to labor is held fixed and the return to capital in both the United States and
Canada declines by only 0.1%. Therefore, demand side considerations are paramount.
In monopolistically competitive industries, liberalization affects the firm's demand
curve in two ways. Domestic tariff reductions increase import competition for domestic
firms selling to the domestic market. The increase in competition emerges in the model as
an increase in the elasticity of demand by domestic consumers for the domestically
produced good. Domestic firms are led to reduce the mark-up of price over marginal cost
and raise output, thereby reaping economies of scale. This is frequently referred to as the
'pro-competitive' effect of tariff liberalization.
Foreign tariff reductions have the opposite effect. Domestic firms gain an
improved competitive advantage in the foreign market. The greater market power
emerges as a fall in the perceived elasticity of demand for exports. Firms respond to the
fall in the perceived elasticity of demand by increasing the mark-up over marginal cost on
exports and reducing output.
On balance, the firm's perceived elasticity of demand may rise or fall as a result
of bilateral liberalization so that output per firm may rise or fall. The pro-competitive
effect is apparently very strong in Canada, with output per firm increasing in nine of the
eleven monopolistically competitive tradable industries in which entry can occur. The only
exceptions are paper products and printing and publishing, for which output per firm falls.
Rationalization effects in the United States are slightly weaker. Output per firm
remains unchanged in five of the eleven monopolistically competitive tradable sectors and
falls in one.
There are instances in which the pro-competitive effect is so strong that exit
occurs in both the United States and Canada even when the industry is expanding. For
example, output of the footwear industry in Canada rises, but the number of firms
declines. Expansion is brought about entirely by increasing output per firm. Footwear
production in the United States declines, but the fall in the number of firms is so great that
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output per firm rises. Similarly, output in the furniture and fixtures and electrical
machinery industries expands in the United States, but contracts in Canada. However,
the number of firms falls in both countries and output per firm increases.
It is more common, however, that increases in industry output are accomplished by
a combination of increasing the number of firms and increasing firm output. For example,
in the United States, production of food, clothing, nonmetallic mineral products, and metal
products expands entirely as a result of entry. Output per firm is virtually unaffected.
Interestingly, these same four industries contract in Canada as a result of exit, but output
per firm rises. Canada's relatively deep tariff reductions give rise to a strong pro-
competitive effect on Canadian firms. This may account for the fact that rationalization
occurs more frequently in Canada than in the United States.
The percent changes in employment in the last column in Tables 7A-7C and 8A-
8C more or less mirror the percent changes in output noted in column 4 of the tables. In
the United States, the employment changes are less than one percent, with the exception
of textiles (3.9%), paper products (3.1%), nonferrous metals (- 13.6%), and electrical
machinery (1.2%). This suggests that the United States would not experience major
disruptions in labor markets, especially when it is recalled that the tariff reductions would
be phased in over a ten-year period. On the other hand, in Canada, there are sizable
percent increases in employment in leather products (4.9%), chemicals (17.9%), nonferrous
metals (152.4%), miscellaneous manufactures (7.3%), and iron and steel (28.5%), and
sizable percent reductions in employment in agriculture (-5.6%), wood products (-6.1%),
textiles (- 35.4%), clothing (- 6.4%), paper products (- 19.3%), nonmetallic mineral
products (-116.8%), metal products (-7.1%), electrical machinery (-14.2%), and
petroleum products (-11.6%).
Our computational results thus suggest that there will be a significant increase in
inter-industry specialization, especially in Canada, as a result of the FTA. Strong pro-
competitive effects emerge in many Canadian industries in which entry and exit occur due
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to Canada's relatively deep tariff reductions. There may be sizable labor reallocation
effects in Canada, although the phasing in of the tariff removal would mitigate some of the
adjustment problems that might occur otherwise. In the aggregate, nonetheless, our
results indicate that economic welfare would be increased in Canada and in the United
States with the bilateral removal of tariffs.
VI. Summary Assessment of the FTA
It seems appropriate to ask in conclusion how our results compare to those
obtained in other studies. As noted in Table 2, the two classes of studies of the effects of
the U.S.-Canadian FTA include those based on general equilibrium models and those based
on macroeconometric models. It is important to note that our present study as well as
most previous ones suggest that the FTA will be beneficial to both Canada and the United
States, although there is some disagreement as to how large the benefits may be.
A welfare gain as the result of bilateral tariff removal in the range of one to two
percent of national income for Canada but less than one percent for the United States
seems plausible. Significantly larger welfare gains for Canada obtained by some studies
were revised downward in light of new information concerning the proper specification of
key parameters.
Some models obtained negative welfare results for one or the other of the
countries. However, this can be traced to the doubtful assumption that intra-industry
trade is generated by national product differentiation. It is nonetheless comforting to know
that even under such a pessimistic assumption the possible welfare loss is only a small
fraction of one percent of national income.
It is difficult to interpret the results based on the macroeconometric models
because these models do not capture the essential microeconomic behavior that governs the
responses of firms to the changes in relative prices and competitive pressures that the
FTA would engender. We are skeptical accordingly of the detailed industry results that
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are obtained, for example, in the Economic Council of Canada studies by Magun et
al. (1987, 1988).
We noted in our earlier discussion that the FTA entails some minor bilateral
modifications in certain existing NTBs, and, more importantly, a variety of potentially far-
reaching changes in the rules and procedures governing bilateral trade and investment
relations that would reduce the uncertainty of policies and lower the costs of transactions.
We have not been able to quantify the effects of these changes. But when their potential is
viewed in conjunction with the benefits that will be realized as the result of the bilateral
elimination of tariffs, our overall assessment of the FTA is that it will enhance economic
welfare in both the United States and Canada. It is very likely that the rest of the world
will benefit as well since they are affected in only a minor way by the bilateral tariff
elimination and they may benefit from the improvements in the bilateral trading




Brown, Drusilla K. 1988. "Tariffs, the Terms of Trade and National Product
Differentiation," Journal of Policy Modeling, forthcoming.
Brown, Drusilla K. and Robert M. Stern. 1987. "A Modeling Perspective," in Robert
M. Stern, Philip H. Tresize, and John Whalley (eds.), Perspectives on a U.S.-
Canadian Free Trade Agreement. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
Brown, Drusilla K. and Robert M. Stern. 1988. "Computational Analysis of the U.S.-
Canada Free Trade Agreement: The Role of Product Differentiation and Market
Structure," National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Trade Policies for
International Competitiveness, Cambridge, MA, April 29-30,1988.
Deardorff, Alan V. and Robert M. Stern. 1986. The Michigan Model of World Production
and Trade: Theory and Applications. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Dixit, Avinash, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1977. "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum
Product Diversity," American Economic Review 76, 297-308.
Dungan, Peter. 1985. "The Macroeconomic Impacts of Free Trade with the United
States: Lessons from the FOCUS-PRISM Models." Institute for Policy Analysis,
University of Toronto, Working Paper, DP 85-86 (November),
Government of Canada, Department of Finance. 1988. The Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement: An Economic Assessment. Ottawa.
Hamilton, Bob and John Whalley. 1985. "Geographically Discriminatory Trade
Arrangements," Review of Economics and Statistics 57 (August), 446-455.
Harris, Richard G. and David Cox. 1985. "Summary of a Project on the General
Equilibrium Evaluation of Canadian Trade Policy," in John Whalley (ed.), Canada-
United States Free Trade, Vol. 11, Research Studies, Royal Commission on the
Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada. Toronto: University of
Toronto Press.
Informetrica Ltd. 1985. "Economic Impacts of Enhanced Bilateral Trade: National and
Provincial Results." Prepared for the Department of External Affairs, Government
of Canada.
Magun, Sunder, Someshwar Rao, and Bimal Lodh. 1987. "Impact of Canada-U.S. Free
Trade on the Canadian Economy," Economic Council of Canada, Discussion Paper
No. 331 (August).
Magun, Sunder, Someshwar Rao, Bimal Lodh, Laval Lavallee, and Jonathan Peirce.
1988. "Open Borders: An Assessment of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,"
Economic Council of Canada, Discussion Paper No. 344 (April).
Markusen, James and Randall M. Wigle. 1987. "U.S.-Canada Free Trade: Effects on
Welfare and Sectoral Output/Employment Levels in the Short and Long Run," in
process.
Shoven, John B. and John Whalley. 1984. "Applied General Equilibrium Models of
Taxation and International Trade: An Introduction and Survey," The Journal of
Economic Literature 22, 1007-51.
Spence, Michael E. 1976. "Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition,"
Review of Economic Studies 43, 217-36.
Venables, Anthony J. 1985. "Trade and Trade Policy with Imperfect Competition: The
Case of Identical Products and Free Entry," Journal of International Economics 19
(August), 1-20.
Wharton Econometrics. 1987. "Canada-U.S. Free Trade: Opportunities, Risks and
Prospects" (September).
Wigle, Randall M. 1988. "General Equilibrium Evaluation of Canada-U.S. Trade
Liberalization in a Global Context," Canadian Economic Journal, forthcoming.
Table 1
Comparison of Post-Tokyo Round
Canadian and U.S. Trade Barriers
Canada United States
Industry Tariff NTBs (tariff Tariff NTBs (tariff
rate equivalent) rate equivalent)
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Agriculture 2.2 11.9 2.2 6.9
Forestry 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2
Fishing and trapping 0.2 0.0 1.4 0.0
Metal mines 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0
Mineral fuels 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.0
Non-metal mines and quarries 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.4
Food and beverage 4.2 9.0 3.5 8.5
Tobacco products 16.0 0.0 10.1 0.6
Rubber and plastics products 8.9 0.0 8.4 0.4
Leather products 12.0 4.2 7.9 0.0
Textiles 8.9 0.0 7.3 0.4
Knitting mills 21.5 0.0 12.6 0.4
Clothing 17.2 0.0 10.7 0.4
Wood products 2.7 0.0 1.4 12.9
Furniture and fixtures 12.6 0.0 3.0 0.8
Paper and allied products 4.0 0.0 0.9 0.3
Printing and publishing 1.4 0.8 0.5 0.2
Primary metals 4.0 1.3 2.2 4.2
Metal fabricating 6.8 0.9 3.2 1.0
Machinery 4.7 0.9 2.5 3.0
Transportation and equipment 2.3 0.0 0.5 0.0
Electrical products 6.1 0.9 3.7 0.1
Non-metallic mineral products 3.4 0.0 2.9 0.0
Petroleum and coal products 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.0
Chemicals and chemical products 5.6 0.0 2.2 1.2
Misc. manufacturing 6.2 0.9 3.5 0.2
Weighted average 3.8 1.0 2.3 1.8
Source: Adapted from Magun, Rao, and Lodh (1987, pp. 25 and 141-153).
Table 2
Summary of Studies of Estimated Changes in Real Income
Resulting from a U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Agreement
Change in Real Income
Study United Other
Canada States Countries
(%) (%) (Mill. $)
General equilibrium models
Harris and Cox (1985) 8.9
Canadian Department of Finance (1988) 2.5
Markusen and Wigle (1987) 0.6 0.1 Negative
Wigle (1988) -0.1 0.1
Hamilton and Whalley (1985) 0.6 -0.04 Negative
Brown and Stern (1987) -0.3 0.03 -19.8
Macroeconometric models
Informetrica (1985) 3.0
Institute for Policy Analysis (1985) 3.3
Wharton Econometrics (1987) 3.1
Economic Council of Canada
(1987) 3.3
(1988) 2.5
Notes: The estimates reported are sensitive to the degree of response of exports and
imports to changes in relative prices. The results in the Harris and Cox and
Department of Finance analyses are sensitive to the price response of import-
competing manufacturing firms to the reduction of domestic trade barriers. Estimates
for a given study vary due to different assumptions about the extent of trade
liberalization and the size of the rationalization gain resulting from freer trade. The
complete citations for the studies noted are given in the list of references.
Source: Adapted in part from Government of Canada, Department of Finance (1988,
p. 32).
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Parameters of the Model: United States
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Summary Results of a U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Area:
Changes in Country Imports, Exports, Exchange Rates,
Terms of Trade, and Welfare
(Trade and Welfare in Millions of U.S. Dollars)
Exchange Terms of Trade Equivalent
Country Imports* Exports* Rate** Percent Change Variation
United States 6,018.4 7,348.0 -0.0 0.1 1,540.6
Other -8,783.6 -3,415.5 0.4 -0.1 -142.7
Canada 8,272.6 8,544.0 -1.1 -0.2 2,077.0
*Dollar value of change in trade volume




Sectoral Effects on the United States of U.S.-Canadian Bilateral Tariff Elimination
Perfect Competition
Percent Change
Imports From No. Firms
Sector Exports Output Elasticity Capital Rental Rate Employment
World Canada U.S. World
Tradable Industries
Agriculture -0.9 3.9 15.9 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.1 -0.5
Leather Products 2.1 4.4 36.3 -0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.1 -0.6
Wood Products 2.1 0.1 -2.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 -0.1 0.5
Nontradable Industries
Construction -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.0
Personal Services -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.0
Table 7B
Sectoral Effects on the United States of U.S.-Canadian Bilateral Tariff Elimination
Monopolistic Competition
Percent Change
Imports From No. Firms
Sector Exports Output Elasticity Capital Rental Rate Employment
World Canada U.S. World
Tradable Industries
Food 7.7 7.2 46.2 0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.1 -0.0
Textiles 33.1 5.4 101.0 3.9 0.0 0.0 -0.0 0.8 -0.1 3.9
Clothing 51.3 3.8 228.4 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.0 0.8 -0.1 0.7
Footwear 82.1 4.4 130.3 -0.5 -0.6 -0.4 0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -0.5
Furniture & Fixtures 85.9 25.0 60.8 0.8 -0.8 -1.0 1.5 -0.3 -0.1 0.8
Paper Products 17.8 -21.2 -23.4 3.1 1.9 0.8 1.1 2.5 -0.1 3.1
Printing & Publishing 11.7 1.7 -7.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.2
Chemicals 9.3 14.8 84.2 0.8 0.0 0.0 9.6 0.6 -0.1 0.8
Nonmetallic Min. Products 18.2 -2.2 -19.2 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.0 1.0 -0.1 0.9
Nonferrous Metals -0.0 62.6 167.5 -13.6 -13.6 -5.6 -0.0 -13.4 -0.1 -13.6
Metal Products 28.7 11.7 51.2 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.0 0.8 -0.1 0.7
Nonelectrical Machinery 3.4 12.1 35.1 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3
Electrical Machinery 14.2 4.9 55.5 1.2 -0.4 -0.5 1.5 0.0 -0.1 1.2
Transport Equipment -0.5 0.3 0.1 -0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 -0.1 -0.0
Misc. Manufactures 3.9 6.0 33.5 -0.5 0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 -0.5
Nontradable Industries
Wholesale Trade -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.1 -0.1
Transportation 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.1 -0.0








Sector Exports Output Firms Price Marginal Capital Rental Rate Employment
World Canada U.S. Cost
Tradable Industries
Petroleum Products 0.3 -4.8 -11.4 0.4 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.5 -0.1 0.2
Rubber Products 28.3 15.1 72.0 0.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.1
Glass Products 20.8 23.5 107.4 0.4 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 -0.1 0.4
Iron & Steel 9.3 10.3 53.8 -0.5 -0.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.5
Nontradable Industries
Mining & Quarrying -0.4 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.5




Sectoral Effects on Canada of U.S.-Canadian Bilateral Tariff Elimination
Perfect Competition
Percent Change
Imports From No. Firms
Sector Exports Output Elasticity Capital Rental Rate Employmen
World U.S. Canada World
Tradable Industries
Agriculture -3.6 23.8 33.7 -5.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 -5.5 -0.1 -5.6
Leather Products 10.8 4.7 27.7 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 -0.1 4.9
Wood Products -4.2 28.4 34.5 -6.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -6.1 -0.1 -6.1
Nontradable Industries
Construction 1.1 0.0 0.0 1.2 -0.1 1.0




Sectoral Effects on Canada of U.S.-Canadian Bilateral Tariff Elimination
Monopolistic Competition
Percent Change
Imports From No. Firms
Sector Exports Output Elasticity Capital Rental Rate Employment
World U.S. Canada World
Tradable Industries
Food 16.3 40.5 82.7 -1.9 -2.7 -2.5 0.1 -2.4 -0.1 -1.9
Textiles 19.5 82.2 179.9 -35.4 0.0 0.0 -5.1 -2.1 -0.1 -35.4
Clothing 81.6 38.1 283.4 -6.4 -8.6 -6.8 0.7 -8.3 -0.1 -6.4
Footwear 90.1 15.3 254.6 2.2 -1.4 -1.0 2.0 1.2 -0.1 2.2
Furniture & Fixtures 59.9 118.8 179.5 -2.5 -13.6 -12.1 9.3 -10.5 -0.1 -2.5
Paper Products -23.5 96.8 103.1 -19.3 -19.1 -17.2 -1.0 -19.2 -0.1 -19.3
Printing & Publishing -8.3 23.0 25.2 -3.2 -3.1 -2.7 -0.6 -3.1 -0.1 -3.3
Chemicals 83.3 9.1 35.0 17.9 0.0 0.0 59.0 9.0 -0.1 17.9
Nonmetallic Min. Products -22.9 51.9 73.7 -16.8 -17.2 -13.5 -0.2 -16.8 -0.1 -16.8
Nonferrous Metals 151.6 34.8 52.2 152.4 150.3 -8.4 0.3 150.9 -0.1 152.4
Metal Products 31.1 83.6 114.4 -7.1 -9.0 -7.8 0.5 -8.1 -0.1 -7.1
Nonelectrical Machinery 25.2 15.3 25.7 -1.2 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.1 -0.1 -1.2
Electrical Machinery 27.0 60.6 94.8 -14.2 -18.1 -13.7 2.1 -17.3 -0.1 -14.2
Transport Equipment -0.1 1.0 0.9 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 -0.1 0.5
Misc. Manufactures 31.2 12.1 37.8 7.3 -13.2 -5.3 17.1 -6.3 -0.1 7.3
Nontradable Industries
Wholesale Trade 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.7 -0.1 0.5
Transportation 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.6 -0.1 0.5
Financial Services 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.5 -0.1 0.4
Table 8C




Sector Exports Output Firms Price Marginal Capital Rental Rate Employment
World U.S. Canada Cost
Tradable Industries
Petroleum Products -11.9 0.1 9.7 -11.5 0.0 -1.2 -0.6 -8.5 -0.1 -11.6
Rubber Products 67.1 49.2 100.9 -1.2 0.0 -3.0 -1.9 0.1 -0.1 -1.2
Glass Products 81.1 39.8 64.7 -3.9 0.0 -4.5 -1.2 -1.5 -0.1 -3.9
Iron & Steel 34.2 44.0 92.4 28.5 7.2 -2.9 -0.9 7.9 -0.1 28.5
Nontradable Industries
Mining & Quarrying -1.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 -0.8 -0.1 -1.1
Utilities 0.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 0.4 -0.1 0.1
r
f
Copies of the technical appendix can be obtained by sending a self-




The University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1220
DATE DUE

